Adolf Hitler’s view of Britain wavered between implacable foe and natural partner in a division of the world. In Mein Kampf (1925), he castigated Imperial Germany for pursuing a pointless fleet-building program that forced Britain into alliance with its traditional colonial enemies France and Russia. In the “Hossbach Memorandum” (1937) he described both France and Britain as “hate-filled” opponents who would never accept Germany’s revival. In 1934-1935 he still had hopes of winning over Britain, if only to disrupt the emerging Franco-British-Italian common front.
In November 1934, the Germans told the British that they wanted to reach a bilateral agreement that would allow the Germany navy to rise to 35 percent of the British navy.[1] The offer simultaneously attracted and disturbed the British. The Germans seemed bent on rearming in defiance of the Versailles Treaty in any case. The British most feared German bombing of cities. An agreement on navies could lead to an agreement on air forces. So, the German offer deserved consideration.
Several questions had to be resolved. First, could Britain tolerate ANY German naval rearmament? The Royal Navy had to be dispersed to meet its global responsibilities, while a German fleet would be concentrated in the North Sea and North Atlantic. Could Britain defend itself in Europe against a fleet one-third the size of the Royal Navy?
Second, would it be best to shape that rearmament to the kind of German fleet would be easiest to deal with? Would such a German fleet be symmetrical with the Royal Navy (in battle ships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines)? Or would it be a “lighter” fleet organized for attacking merchant shipping (lots of submarines and light cruisers, but few battleships)?
Third, British rearmament would prioritize the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, while German rearmament was already prioritizing the Army (Wehrmacht) and the Air Force (Luftwaffe). Both the British Army and the Germany Navy got the leftovers. Expert opinion held that the Germany Navy would not reach 35 percent of the present Royal Navy until 1942. By that time the Royal Navy would have been greatly expanded. The Germans would never really catch up. Seen from this perspective, a naval agreement might be a strategically meaningless concession while perhaps improving the climate of relations between the two countries. A more meaningful agreement on air forces might follow.
Fourth, the agreement could create diplomatic problems with the French. Britain and France were working up a common front with Italy to check further German violations of Versailles.[2] A bilateral agreement to end the naval disarmament conditions of the multi-lateral Versailles Treaty would be understood in France as both slimy and a betrayal.
Committees considered the issues. They concluded that a German fleet 35 percent the size of the Royal Navy marked the maximum that could be accepted, but it could be accepted. It would be best to insist upon a symmetrical fleet to short-stop one organized for a “guerre de course.” A naval agreement should be followed by pursuit of an agreement on air forces. Finally, “the French be damned” went unspoken, but not unthought.
[1] Joseph Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: Appeasement and the Origins of
the Second World War in Europe (1998).
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