NBC/Telemundo polls[1] revealed a shift in the political preference among Latino voters. 

            In 2016, 69 percent of Latino voters supported Hillary Clinton; 19 percent favored Donald Trump. 

            In 2020, 63 percent of Latino voters chose Joe Biden; 27 percent voted for Donald Trump. 

            In 2024, just before the election, 54 percent of Latino voters favored Kamala Harris; 40 percent favored Donald Trump. 

            That is an almost 22 percent drop for the Democratic candidate in eight years, with 60 percent of it coming in the last four years.  Why the decline? 

When she ran—briefly—in the Democratic presidential primary in 2019, Harris favored decriminalizing illegal border crossings.[2]  Subsequently, under the Biden-Harris administration, President Biden ordered an end to President Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” policy for those seeking asylum.  Illegal immigration tripled.  Then the failure of the Biden-Harris administration’s “Remain in Texas” policy brought home to many northern Democratic cities the realities of such huge, unregulated immigration.  Immigration control became a powerful Republican issue. 

That explains the careening U-turn taken by Kamala Harris.  She began walloping Trump for having squelched a bipartisan border bill for political reasons when Democrats had only adopted the policy recently for political reasons. 

It doesn’t automatically explain why the Latino vote shifted.  That shift may or may not be related to the immigration question.  There are 50.4 million Latinos in states on the border with Mexico.  They would have seen all the same things that drove many Anglos wild. 

Perhaps some are angry about inflation, which hits lower-income people harder than it does higher-income people.[3]  Perhaps some are running small businesses and perceive Democrats as anti-Business, and not merely anti-Big Business.  Perhaps some are socially conservative and are repelled by the Democrat embrace of non-binarity. 

Whatever the cause, it is an important chunk of the Democratic coalition to cast away. 

            In October 2024, an Economist/YouGov poll assessed the state of American opinion on the Israel-Palestinian conflict.[4] 

            Overall, 33 percent sympathized more with Israel, 19 percent more with the Palestinians, and 24 percent with both sides equally.  (Which totals 76 percent.  What about the other 24 percent?  “Don’t Know” or “A plague on both their houses”?)  Under that umbrella huddle different groups.  Only 14 percent of Democrats sympathize more with Israelis, while 33 percent sympathize more with the Palestinians.  (That’s 47 percent.  So the other 53 percent sympathize with both sides equally or Don’t Care?)  In contrast, 63 percent of Republicans express more sympathy for Israelis than for Palestinians, while a mere 5 percent sympathize more with Palestinians.  (Again, that’s 68 percent. Do the other 32 percent sympathize equally or just don’t care?)  On the issue of supplying military aid[5] to Israel, 38 percent say that it should be reduced; 18 percent support increasing it; and 25 percent say that it’s fine where it is.  (Again, the figures total 81 percent, so 19 percent probably fall into “Don’t Know.”)  Support for military assistance at or above the current level totals 43 percent, while support for cutting it is at 38 percent.  That’s close to a tipping point. 

            So, 63 percent of Republicans and 14 percent of Democrats sympathize more with Israel than with the Palestinians.  At the same time, support for maintaining military aid at the current level or for raising it totals only 43 percent.  That is a lot lower level than the totals for feeling sympathy for Israel.  Even among their most committed American supporters, the Israelis are encountering doubts about their wars in Gaza and Lebanon.  Probably these doubts are rooted less in the necessity of war than in the manner of its conduct. 

Do Israeli care any longer if they alienate the Americans?  I haven’t seen polling on that. 

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[1] “Poll Watch,” The Week, 11 October 2024, p. 17. 

[2] “Harris: A sharp turn on immigration,” The Week, 11 October 2024, p. 16. 

[3] Donald Trump is said to appeal to “low-information” voters.  The disparate impact of inflation among income groups could leave the better-educated and better-off Democrats as the “low information voters” when it comes to economic hardship.  To turn around Governor Tim Walz’s jab at the ever-obnoxious Elon Musk, “He’s a fat guy with a government job; what does he know about hardship?” 

[4] Poll Watch,” The Week, 18 October 2024

[5] You know, stuff that goes “BOOM!” and then buildings fall down.