The Shan State forms one of Myanmar’s ethnic communities. Located in the northeastern quadrant of Myanmar, it borders southwestern China (Yunnan), Laos, and Thailand. Under other circumstances, a bunch of forested hills on the inland edge of a no-account country would be of no interest. In fact, however, it is an important–and increasingly important—link in the international narcotics supply chain.
For one thing, the many small farms grow both produce and opium poppies. Poppies grow easily in the poor soil often found in hill regions. Poor peasants value poppies as a cash crop. For another thing, part of the anti-Communist Chinese Kuomintang Army retreated from Yunnan into the Shan State after the Communist victory in 1949. Rather than transit to join the other supporters of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, they settled down in Shan State. There the refugee army embarked on opium and heroin production. For yet another thing, since 1962 the central government’s effort to suppress autonomy movements has spawned local resistance groups. As the old saying goes, “For success in war, three things are necessary: money, more money, and still more money.” Shan autonomists have relied upon drug sales to build up military forces more than capable of holding off the army of Myanmar on most occasions.
If opium and heroin built the foundations of the Shan State drug trade, the producers have been alert to changes in global market conditions and new product development. Take, for example methamphetamine and fentanyl. Methamphetamine is a synthetic stimulant. “Crystal meth” is an alternative form of methamphetamine. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that is far stronger than is heroin. All have become popular “recreational” drugs. Much of production of the chemical components of both methamphetamine and fentanyl took place in China. In recent years, pressure from the United States caused the Chinese government to restrict production in China proper. Producers shifted their facilities outside China, including to Shan State.
New supply chain routes then developed. Fishing villages dot Myanmar’s long coastline on the Bay of Bengal. Doubtless the local fishermen feel the same eagerness to profit from the drug trade as do the peasant farmers. Probably they carry their cargo to ports like Yangon and Singapore, while another route may run down the nearby Mekong River to Ho Chi Minh City.
Myanmar’s war with the ethnic groups has been a murky business. To offer one example, the Kachin Defense Army, in Shan State, is suspected of having done a deal with the army of Myanmar involving the drug trade. However, the trouble with criminals—even criminals in uniform—is that they’re dishonest. The Kachins seem to have been sending some of their product to the Arakan Army on the west coast. Discovering this betrayal, the army and police launched a series of raids into Kachin territory in Spring 2020. They hauled in 200 million tabs of meth, 1,100 pounds of crystal meth, 630 pounds of heroin, and almost 1,000 gallons of methyl fentanyl. The army probably sought to remind the Kachins of the deal, not break the deal.
 Attributed variously to Marshal Trivulzio and Raimondo Montecucolli.
 You might enjoy and learn from “Proof of Life” (dir. Taylor Hackford, 2000).
 Hannah Beech and Saw Nang, “Record Raids in Myanmar Point to Shifting Drug Trade,” NYT, 20 May 2020.