“Trump did it, so it must be the wrong thing.” Fair rule of thumb/heuristic device. However, seen in a historical perspective, some further thought may be in order.
First, the military historian John Keegan dissected the liberal mindset with regard to international order on the eve of the Second Iraq War in 2003. He called this mindset “Olympianism.” According to Keegan, it “seeks to influence and eventually control the behavior of states not by the traditional means of resorting to force as a last resort but by supplanting force by rational procedures, exercised through a supranational bureaucracy and supranational legal systems and institutions.” Keegan regarded this view as delusional, but widespread. He describes the “Olympian ethic” as “opposition to any form of international action lying outside the now commonly approved limits of legal disapproval and treaty condemnation.”
European states weren’t the only ones touched by “Olympianism.” The Report of the 9/11 Commission tells readers that the US Government struggled to respond to the early attacks by Al Qaeda. These early attacks included the bombing of two embassies in East Africa, and the attack on the USS “Cole” during a port call in Yemen. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency doubted he had the authority to kill some foreign terrorist just because the terrorist was trying to kill Americans. Much thought went into how to capture Osama bin Laden. Many Republicans, but also Democrats, belabored President Bill Clinton over the missile attack on a suspected Al Qaeda site in Khartoum, Sudan. The evidence in the 9/11 Report suggests that the Clinton administration then slow-walked the investigation of the “Cole” bombing so that it wouldn’t be forced to do something that would lead to a further tide of abuse. Attempts to kill Bin Laden in Afghanistan with cruise missiles failed because the diplomatic proprieties required the US Government to inform the government of Pakistan that the US would be flying cruise missiles across its territory. This in spite of the fact that Pakistani intelligence had close ties to the Taliban government that was sheltering Bin Laden.
The response to the killing of Qassim Soleimani suggests that “Olympianism” has taken hold elsewhere.
Second, the war correspondent-turned historian Thomas Ricks has sought to explain the poor performance of the US Army in recent wars. In his explanation, during the Second World War, Chief of Staff George Marshall and ruthless subordinates like Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley, transformed a sleepy, gerontocratic peacetime army into a devastatingly effective instrument of war. They did so, in part, by getting rid of any commander who didn’t cut the mustard. After George Marshall and his followers had passed on, the Army reverted to a cautious, self-protective rather than self-critical, bureaucracy. Generals don’t get fired, except for egregious personal misconduct—when it comes to public attention.
If Ricks is correct in his analysis, how should we understand the apparent lack of enthusiasm in the Pentagon for the strike at an Iranian leader who has been asserting his country’s influence throughout the Middle East at the expense of the United States?
Third, it seems unlikely that President Trump’s order to kill General Soleimani is going to have a worse outcome than the decision by the Bush II administration to invade Iraq or the decision by the Obama administration to overthrow the government of Libya.
 John Keegan, The Iraq War (2005), pp. 109, 115.
 Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command From World War II to Today (2012). See also: https://waroftheworldblog.com/2015/08/10/command-crisis/