When the War of the American Revolution began, the rebellious colonies had no real army with which to fight it. The colonists had long relied up militias made up of part-time soldiers. For the most part, these militias had been dedicated to local defense against Indian attacks. The militia units from the frontiers had more experience than did the militias from the eastern territories. They all lacked training, discipline, equipment, and—often—competent officers.
Still, a bunch of them had “seen the elephant” up close. George Washington had a couple of experiences in the back-country, then had a memorable experience with General Edward Braddock’s catastrophic attempt to capture Fort Duquesne. Daniel Morgan (1736-1802) had been a teamster—no very exalted position–on that expedition. Morgan differed greatly from Washington. He was a poor-boy immigrant from New Jersey to the Shenandoah Valley. He arrived with nothing but muscle-power, but there was great need of that on the 18th Century frontier. He began to accumulate property: first a team of horses, then a farm, and later slaves. Braddock’s expedition offered him his first taste of war. It left him unimpressed with British military leadership and also deeply bitter toward British rule after he was severely flogged for smacking one of his officers. Soon, Morgan became an officer in the Virginia militia and experienced at war with the Indians.
Morgan led a company of Virginia riflemen on Benedict Arnold’s expedition through the wilds of Maine to capture Quebec. The effort failed and many American soldiers were captured, Morgan among them. He spent a year in British captivity before being paroled. Upon his release in early 1777, George Washington promoted Morgan to colonel in the Continental Army and told him to raise a regiment of frontier riflemen. Morgan led the regiment in the campaign that ended with the surrender of General John Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga (1777). He and his men passed from this triumph to disaster in the Philadelphia campaign and wintered in Valley Forge (1777-1778). In 1779, fed up with Congress and ts mismanagement of the army, Morgan stormed off in a huff to retirement.
Then Horatio Gates, who had commanded at Saratoga, took charge in the South. Morgan initially declined the offer of a command. When Gates led the army to disaster at Camden (1780), however, Morgan returned to service. The new commander, Nathaniel Greene, put Morgan in command of a small unit. His mission was to avoid a battle while harassing the British lines of communication. In January 1781, Morgan disobeyed the order to avoid battle by setting a trap for a British light force under Banastre Tarleton. The two forces collided at a pasture called the Cowpens in South Carolina on 17 January 1781. Morgan’s adept handling of his militia led to a brilliant, small-scale victory. The American victory had a disproportionate effect because Tarleton’s force—virtually annihilated in the fight—included much of the British light infantry. This hampered Lord Cornwallis going forward in the Southern campaign. It also set a pattern for a campaign of attrition that would end at Yorktown.
Plagued with ills, Morgan left the army soon after Cowpens.
 Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (1961) is still the best biography.
 See Kenneth Roberts, Arundel (1936).