Back in the day, Seymour Martin Lipset wrote The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (1963). Like most of Lipset’s work, it was about several things at once. For one thing, it was about the United States as the first colonial territory to gain its independence from a colonial overlord. Therefore, American could serve as a model for all the Asian and African countries recently or about-to-be liberated from European empires. For another thing, it was about the related issue of how to create a stable democracy. (That’s what most of the leaders of new nations said that they wanted, although the historical record now suggests other ambitions.) According to Lipset democracy is intimately connected with economic growth: “[t]he more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” This idea lay behind both the Marshall Plan to aid Western European economic recovery after the Second World War and the First Gulf War (1990-1991).
Time hasn’t fully born out Lipset’s ideas–so far. China, for example, is an increasingly prosperous autocracy. In many Muslim countries, oligarchies have gobbled up national wealth, while the vast majority of people have little opportunity. More importantly, religious belief can outweigh political theory. It isn’t clear that the beliefs of Islam are compatible with Western conceptions of democracy. Traditional Islam rejects any separation of church and state, it rejects law derived from legislatures rather than the Word of Allah, and it rejects the very idea of nation-states in favor of the “umma” of all Believers. Moreover, Islam is socially conservative in ways that Western liberals find repugnant. Women’s rights and gay rights antagonize social conservatives.
Indonesia provides an interesting case. It is the most populous Muslim country in the world. Piled on top of religious conservatism are hostilities related to ethnic or religious minorities. The very small share of people with Chinese ancestry play an out-sized role in the economy and have long been the target of Muslim hostility. Women’s rights and gay rights have a salience in Muslim concerns because of Indonesia’s popularity with Western tourists.
Like Turkey, Indonesia has a democratic system. Can democratic politics can be used to impose an Islamist agenda? In 2002, Jemaah Islamiya—an Islamist group linked to Al Qaeda—killed 200 people in bomb attacks on the Indonesian island of Bali. Repression followed. Recently, however, there have been both a mass mobilization of Muslims against the Christian governor of Jakarta and renewed terrorist attacks. There is also legislation pending to criminalize public display of affection by gay people.
Will Southeast Asia become the next front in the war against radical Islamism?
 A friend insists that there is a scene from one of Ionesco’s plays in which a character says “We will drink wine under the willow trees. AND YOU WILL BE MY SLAVES!” I haven’t been able to run it down.
 It was a war for oil prices and oil markets, not a war for oil companies. The historically-minded men and women behind the war were aware that the 1970s “oil shocks” had pitched the world close to the edge of depression and that the Great Depression of the Thirties had been the principal cause of the Second World War. They didn’t want that to happen again.
 We’ll probably hear complaints that the University of Michigan Museum of Art is a sign of creeping Islamization.
 Indonesia’s population is 270 million. 87.2 percent Muslim, 9.9 percent Christian, 1.7 percent Hindu, and 0.7 percent Buddhist and 0.2 percent Confucian.
 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Islamist Shift Unsettles Indonesia’s Democracy,” WSJ, 29 June 2018.