Beginning in the 1960s, China’s population began to rise sharply. By the 1970s, China found itself caught in a demographic “scissors”: population was rising faster than the economy was growing. A growing population collided with a relatively stagnant economy. Eventually, living standards would be forced down. Moreover, an extended period of child-care for multiple children restricted China’s ability to mobilize women into the paid-labor force. In 1980 Deng Xiaoping announced the “One-Child Policy” as part of the solution to this problem.[1]
The policy shifted many women into the paid-labor force at a time when China sought to prioritize economic growth. The share of the population of working age people grew substantially in comparison to the share of the population of non-working age people. Basically, that means children and retirees. More labor became available for more years. Huge numbers of Chinese between the ages of 20 and 64 flooded into the work that became available thanks to China’s opening to the West. Double-digit economic growth rates followed. That is, it worked!
There seems not to be available a source that tells us what the government decision-makers anticipated would happen over the long-term. Worrying about what might happen many years down-range from some action taken today can paralyze action.
Today is the down-range of the many-days-ago. What did happen? The One-Child Policy shifted the age composition of the population. Now, China’s population has a shrinking number of working-age people. Women make up half of the working age population. As a result, China also has a shrinking number of child-bearing age women. China’s total population will fall. A United Nations report projects that China’s population will shrink from 1.42 billion in 2024 to 639 million in 2100.[2] Logically, there will be far fewer workers, anywhere from half as many to 60 percent fewer. Thus, demographers anticipate that the most serious effects of this shift will not be felt for another 20 to 30 years.
Nor will they be felt in equal measure by other important countries. For example, in terms of total population, in 2024 it is estimated that there are 1.42 billion Chinese and 344 million Americans; by 2100 there will be 639 million Chinese and 321 million Americans. That is, China will go from having four times as many people as the United States to having twice as many. The U.N. estimates that 31 percent of Chinese will be aged 65 or older by 2050; and 46 percent by 2100. In contrast, the share of over-65s in the American population will by only 23 percent in 2050 and 28 percent in 2100. That means that in 2100 China could have 345 million people under the age of 65, while the United States could have 248 million.
Zi Jinping appears to harbor grand ambitions for China. China looks like it will have fewer workers, fewer consumers, fewer scientists, fewer engineers, and fewer soldiers. The human basis of those great ambitions will slowly erode.
Will this foster a sense of desperation among Chinese leaders, either Zi in the immediate future or his successors in the later 21st Century? There are ways to adapt to changing conditions. You just have to be willing to do it.
[1] Liyan Qi and Ming Li, “China Pays Price for Its One-Child Policy,” WSJ, 12 July 2024.
[2] However, in 2022, the same U.N. office predicted China’s population would fall to 766.7 million people by 2100. That’s a 128 million-person difference. Another projection says that China will have 525 million people by 2100. It’s not that the demographers are incompetent. It’s just that getting reliable information out of China can be tricky.
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